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Landmarks in growing fields of law frequently receive only pass-
ing contemporary attention. A recent income tax decision of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, Keystone Automobile Club Casualty Com-
pany v. Commissioner,1 may or may not become a landmark in the law
of cooperatives, but its relationship to the timely subject of democracy
certainly makes it of more than passing concern. The case presents
very strikingly the democracy of true cooperatives. The court, not-
withstanding a statutory tax exemption in favor of cooperatives,
refused to free two alleged mutual insurance companies from an
assessment of $167,331.o6 because of its conclusion that they were
not mutuals or cooperatives in view of the absence of democratic
ownership and control.
This is by no means the first time that a spot-light has been thrown
upon the democratic aspects of cooperatives. The late Mr. Justice
Brandeis had occasion long ago to say that the aim of cooperatives is
"economic democracy on lines of liberty, equality and fraternity." 2 In
fact, in conjunction with emphasis upon the present day importance of
a clear conception of the meaning of democracy, the former Senator
George Wharton Pepper has defined democracy in terms of a coopera-
tive institution as follows:
"As I use the term 'democracy' it means a society in which the
people who compose it are their own governors, much as the
policy-holders in a mutual life insurance company are their own
insurers." 3
Claude R. Wickard, the Secretary of Agriculture, has said:
"Ever so often a democracy has to make certain that it is still a
democracy. This test is a simple one-do the people still rule?
And ever so often, a cooperative has to make certain that it is
still a cooperative. This test also is a simple one-do the members
rule?" 4
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Thus the aspect of the self-government of political democracy is not far
removed from that of economic democracy.
Legislative policy in favor of the economic democracy of coopera-
tives is seen on many fronts. The courts in many situations have rec-
ognized the need for treating cooperatives differently from ordinary
business enterprises. The writer has already presented a general out-
line of the background. 5 Here, the attempt will be to make more recent
and complete that part of the picture which pertains to the income tax
status of cooperatives.
Preliminarily, it may be advantageous to set forth the problem
concretely by way of illustration. One hundred persons agree to coop-
erate in the purchase of gasoline for their automobiles. For this pur-
pose they incorporate as a cooperative, and the corporation acquires a
gasoline station to serve the members. The members are charged the
current market price for gasoline delivered to them. At the end of the
tax year, the receipts of the corporation are $12,oo and its expendi-
tures $io,ooo. Must the corporation pay income tax on the $2,000
difference? How is the situation affected by any one of the following
factors: (i) if before the end of the taxable year, the $2,000 is dis-
tributed to the one hundred members in proportion to their purchases
of gasoline; (2) if this is done after the taxable year has ended; (3) if
the $2,000'is not distributed but is used to pay a debt incurred in pur-
chasing a gasoline station; (4) if the $2,ooo is simply carried to sur-
plus; or (5) if the $2,ooo is carried to surplus and certificates of inter-
est in surplus are distributed before the end of the taxable year to the
one hundred members in proportion to their purchases? Assume that
the following year the one hundred members are charged five-sixths of
the market price, so that at the end of the tax year there are no excess
receipts. Is this situation inherently different from any of the fore-
going situations?
Two matters must be given entirely separate consideration. One
is tax exemption and the other is tax applicability. The two must not
be confused. One is a matter of legislative grace; the other involves,
in the absence of constitutional questions, merely statutory construc-
tion. In result, a tax exemption to a cooperative is no different from a
statutory construction that a tax statute is not applicable to the opera-
ions of a cooperative; in either case no tax becomes due. But as a prac-
tical matter the distinction is important.0 In the case of an exemption,
5. PACKEL, C0OMATIVEs (1940) 21 et seq.
6. In Huntley v. Southern Oregon Sales, 102 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939)
this distinction was made to allow a cooperative to sue within four years instead of
two years in order to obtain a refund of income taxes from which it claimed exemp-
tion.
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it is fitting and proper that there be a matter of public policy to justify
it. In the other case, no justification need be sought, because there is
equality of treatment so far as the legislature has seen fit to make the
statute operative. Thus in the case of the income tax, an exemption to
a charity needs, and has, a justification; but the non-liability of a busi-
ness corporation which has had in the taxable year no profits but only
losses requires no special justification.
In this country the income tax liability of cooperatives has received
little analysis, although some attention has been given to it by the courts.
Most of the opinions in which the issues have been discussed give a per-
functory treatment, but little direct damage seems to have been done,
because the discussions almost invariably have been dicta which in no
way affected the proper result. Yet, a tremendous amount of money
seems to be involved in hosts of cases which never even reach the
courts, but which are disposed of in reliance upon language in such
opinions. For example, in 1936, which appears to be the last year for
which complete figures are available, 4,oo farmers' cooperatives in the
United States paid to their patrons in proportion to their patronage the
sum of $25,38o,ooo. 7 It is impossible to determine how much tax was
collected on that sum and on accumulations which were retained by.
cooperatives as reserves or as surplus.
THaE ENGLISH "APPEASEMENT"
Adherents of the cooperative movement in England might well say
that the appeasement policy of the late Mr. Chamberlain did not start at
Munich. In his budget speech for 1932,8 he referred to the "vigorous
and growing protest" against the existing, so-called exemption to coop-
eratives. In his efforts to appease, he consulted privately with repre-
sentatives of the cooperatives, for which he was subjected to criticism.9
Ultimately, his recommendation was adopted, so that under Section 31
of the Finance Act of 1933 10 "any reference to profits or gains" in the
income tax law is "deemed to include a reference to a profit or surplus
arising from transactions of the company or society with its members,"
but patronage refunds are authorized "to be deducted as expenses."
Prior to 1933, cooperatives in England were liable only for a tax
on income, from their assets.': In that year for the: first time, they
7. FARm CREniT ADmINISTRATIoK, A STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF FmEs' Co-
OPERATIVES 1938) 6.
8. See Cooperative Societies and Income Tar (932) 173 L. T. 326.
9. (1933) i75 L. T. 313, 314. In his attempt to smooth ruffled feeling, he took the
position that the Government was neither denying nor attacking the principle of mutu-
ality but was merely defining the area in which it was operative. Id. at 428.
io. CrryT'S STATS. (1933) 1386.
II. INcOME TAX Acr OF 1918, § 39 (4), CHrrrY's STATS. (x9i8) 676. See Jones
v. South-West Lancashire Coal Owners' Ass'n, [1927] A. C. 827; New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Styles, 14 App. Cas. 381 (889).
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became liable for a tax on those receipts from members which they
chose to retain instead of returning to the members. At the time of
the proposed change, it was criticized 12 on the ground that it "...
recommended that these societies should be treated on the lines of an
ordinary trading company, because this would meet criticism, without,
in fact, placing any greater financial liability on the societies." The
reason for this conclusion was the obvious point that the tax could
easily be eluded in various ways. Indeed, at that very time it was indi-
cated that cooperatives could avoid the tax by reducing their prices or
by declaring maximum patronage dividends. Surpluses, if necessary,
could be created either by imposing special assessments for that pur-
pose, or by agreements for the retention of patronage refunds as loans
to the cooperative.' 3
The question in England is old, and the controversy has been
heated. In 1922, it was pointed out that great opposition arose among
ordinary business men who considered that the cooperatives were sail-
ing under false colors in claiming that cooperative dealings were dis-
tinguishable from ordinary business dealings.' 4 In 1933, the tax
collector and business viewpoint was stated by Mr. Hore-Belisha,
Financial Secretary to the Treasury.' 5  He said, as a good tax col-
lector,' -6 that there should be some limit to mutuality because otherwise
the whole country might be covered by cooperatives and the govern-
ment would receive no income tax. For business, he said, they would
like to see "equality of sacrifice as regards the Revenue."
For the cooperatives it was countered that if additional taxes were
necessary they should be levied, and to the extent that they were appli-
cable to cooperatives they -would be paid, but that it was unfair to
extend an income tax solely to tax cooperatives for what in fact was
not income. The objections of business organizations were met with
the comment that "the grievance is due to the spread of the practice of
co-operative trading, and that is outside questions of tax." 17
THaE UIiTED STATES "Topsy"
In contrast to the rather deliberate course pursued in England, the
problem of the taxation of cooperatives in the United States has merely
12. (1932) 73 L. J. 75.
13. (1933) 175 L. T. 314.
14. See Crichton, Co-operative Societies and Income Tax (1922) 38 LAW Q. REv.
48, in which reference is made to the Royal Commission appointed in i9ig which pre-
sented majority and minority views.
15. (1933) 175 L. T. 427.
16. "To the tax collector, all receipts are income." Union Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 115 F. (2d) 86, 87 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 700 (194).
17. (1932) 73 L. J. 75.
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been permitted to grow. True, there may have been some battles for
and against certain exemptions,18 but, in the main, the provisions con-
cerning cooperatives in the revenue acts have been adopted and con-
tinued haphazardly, without real study and analysis. Thus, as will be
shown later, there are at least fifteen different types of exemptions
relating to various kinds of cooperatives, and each of these seems to
bear little or no relationship to the other. Objections to certain aspects
of an exemption have been modified in one of the. water-tight compart-
ments, whereas the same objection in another kind of exemption has
been completely ignored. There has been no real attempt to correlate
the same problems insofar as they affect different kinds of cooperatives.
In making comparisons to the situation in England, several differ-
ences must be kept in mind. In England, it has always been true, as
was indicated approximately seventy-five years ago,' 9 that cooperatives
made it a practice to deal with the public, whereas in this country the
tendency of cooperatives has been to prohibit, or to limit the amount
of, dealings with non-members. In England, probably because of an
early criticism, 2° the practice of having a host of cooperative statutes,
one for each functional type of cooperative, is much more limited than
in this country, where in a single jurisdiction can be found a great
number of acts for the incorporation of different kinds of coopera-
tives. A final distinction to be noted is that in England an income tax
can be made applicable to non-income receipts without constitutional
objection, whereas in this country income taxes may raise questions as
to the limitations of the Constitution of the United States.
The Sixteenth Amendment empowered Congress "to lay and col-
lect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration." In Farmers' Union Cooptrative Co. v. Commis-
sioner 21 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the contention
on behalf of a cooperative that its receipts were not "income" within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. It appears to be the only
case on the subject.22 The cooperative argued that its activity differed
from ordinary corporate economic practice because the distribution of
18. See note 55 infra.
ig. RIcHTER, CooPERATmvE SToRES (1867) c. 4.
2o. Brabrook, The Cooperative Societies Act of z87i (I87i)' 32 LAW MAG. &
REv. (3d Series) i.
21. go F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
22. In Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523 (92o) it was
urged unsuccessfully that the Sixteenth Amendment should lead the Court to'construe
the early legislation there involved in such a way that the receipts of a mutual insur-
ance company should not be considered the equivalent of gross income. The Court did
not discuss, however, any question of constitutionality. Subsequently a new system
of taxation of life insurance companies was adopted, under which premiums were ex-
cluded from gross income and taxes were imposed upon interest, dividends and rents,
less specified deductions. See National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 5o8
(927).
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benefits is in proportion to individual dealings rather than in proportion
to capital investment. The court said: "This argument would acquire
force and would require examination here if such were the situation of
petitioner." The court held, however, that it was not necessary to con-
sider this serious question, because benefits did not pass according to
patronage in that dividends up to eight per cent. were payable on stock
and a substantial amount of business was done with non-members who
were treated differently from members.
Thus, undecided today is this important question of whether re-
ceipts from members of a cooperative which conducts its affairs on a
truly cooperative basis constitute income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment. Counsel for cooperatives will no doubt argue
that receipts from members are not economic gain but mere advances
to the cooperative to meet expenses and in some cases to accumulate
necessary reserves or surplus; whereas, the tax collector will argue that
receipts are in fact, if not in theory, for the furnishing of economic
services. It is to be noted that the undecided question relates to re-
ceipts from the members of the cooperative. It does not relate to other
receipts. For example, if part of the receipts are used for investment
purposes, then interest, dividends or capital gains on those investments
are clearly taxable income. As will be noted subsequently, however,
Congress has seen fit to exempt such income for certain kinds of co-
operatives.
The absence of authority on the constitutional problem does not
mean that there has been little litigation with regard to the liability of
cooperatives for income taxes. The host of cases arising before the
courts and the Board of Tax Appeals have been decided on the basis
of the statutory provisions and the regulations. The constitutional
question, apparently, has not been involved or possibly in some cases
has been overlooked.
UNCOORDINATED TAX LEGISLATION AS TO COOPERATIVES
A picture of the chaotic condition of the income taxation of co-
operatives can be best presented by a reference to all the pertinent
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The picture could be made
more complicated by a reference to the many rules, regulations, and
administrative rulings and decisions. For purposes of this article,
however, it seems best to avoid such references. Income taxes are
levied in relationship to "net income" which in Section 21 is defined
as "gross income computed under Section 22, less the deductions
allowed by Section 23." "Gross income" -under Section 22
"includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages,
or compensation for personal service . . ., of whatever kind and
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in whatever form paid, or from. . . trades, businesses, commerce,
or sales, or dealings in property . . .growing out of the owner-
ship or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent,
dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on
for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever ... "
and the only exclusion applicable to a cooperative is "to the extent pro-
vided in section i6. .... Receipts of sbipowners' mutual protection
and indemnity associations." Section ii6 (g) provides that the fol-
lowing shall not be included in gross income:
"The receipts of shipowners' mutual protection and indemnity
associations not organized for profit, and no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder; but
such corporations shall be subject as other persons to the tax upon
their net income from interest, dividends, and rents."
In lieu of the usual income taxes, a special classification is made
in Supplement G for insurance companies and in Supplement Q for
mutual investment companies. Supplement G deals with three kinds
of insurance companies: (i) life insurance companies; (2) insurance
companies other than life or mutual; and (3) mutual insurance com-
panies other than life. Section 2oi of Supplement G provides that
"'life insurance company' means an insurance company engaged in
the business of issuing life insurance and annuity contracts. . ." It
might be contended that this definition does not include a mutual life
insurance company, because a cooperative does not engage in business.
That contention, however, loses its force, because Supplement G on its
face appears to be all-inclusive.2 8 Section 2o2 defines "gross income"
of insurance companies as "the gross amount of income received during
the taxable year from interest, dividends and rents." Thus it excludes
as part of income the premiums receievd from policyholders. In con-
irast, is Section 207 which provides that: "Mutual marine insurance
companies shall include in gross income the gross premiums collected
and received by them less amounts paid for reinsurance." The section
further provides that mutual insurance companies other than life may
deduct in addition to ordinary deductions:
"(A) the net addition required by law to be made within the tax-
able year to reserve funds...
(B) the sums other than dividends paid within the taxable year
on policy and annuity contracts."
It then provides as an additional deduction for mutual marine insur-
ance companies "amounts repaid to policyholders on account of premi-
ums previously paid by them, and interest paid upon such amounts
between the ascertainment and the payment thereof"; and as an addi-
23. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523 (1920).
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tional deduction for mutual insurance companies (other than life and
marine) which require members to make premium deposits to provide
for losses and expenses, "the amount of premium deposits returned to
their policyholders and the amount of premium deposits retained for the
payment of losses, expenses and reinsurance reserves."
Supplement Q imposes a special income tax on so-called mutual
investment companies which, in Section 361 are defined so as to mean
"any domestic corporation . . . other than a personal holding com-
pany . . ." which complies with certain requirements such as "an
amount not less than 90 per centum of its net income is distributed to
its shareholders as taxable dividends during the taxable year; and . . .
its shareholders are, upon reasonable notice, entitled to redemption of
their stock for their proportionate interest in the corporation's proper-
ties, or the cash equivalent thereof less a discount not in excess of 3
per centum thereof".
VARIETY IN STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
In contrast to the provisions mentioned above as to non-taxability,
as to computation of net income and as to special taxation of designated
types of cooperatives, are the provisions for exemption. Section IOI
exempts entirely from any obligation to pay income tax the following:
"(I) Labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations;
(2) Mutual savings banks not having a capital stock repre-
sented by shares; . . .
(4) Domestic building and loan associations substantially
all the business of which is confined to making loans to members;
and cooperative banks without capital stock organized and operated
for mutual purposes and without profit;
(5) Cemetery companies owned and operated exclusively
for the benefit of their members or which are not operated for
profit .
(7) Business leagues, chambers of commerce, real estate
boards or boards of trade .
(8) Civic leagues or organizations not organized for
profit...
(9) Clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure,
recreation and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of. the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder;
(io) Benevolent life insurance associations of a purely local
character, mutual ditch or irrigation companies, mutual or cooper-
ative telephone companies, or like organizations; but only if 85 per
centum or more of the income consists of amounts collected from
members for the sole purpose of meeting losses and expenses;
(ii) Farmers' or other mutual hail, cyclone, casualty or fire
insurance companies or associations . . . the income of which is
used or held for the purpose of paying losses or expenses;
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(12) Farmers', fruit growers', or like associations organized
and operated on a cooperative basis (a) for the purpose of mar-
keting . . . and turning back .- . . the [net] proceeds of sales
n. . .or (b) for the purpose of purchasing of supplies and equip-
ment . . . at actual cost, plus necessary expenses. Exemption
shall not be denied any such association because it has capital stock,
if the dividend rate of such stock is fixed . . . and if substantially
all such stock . . . is owned by producers who market their prod-
ucts or purchase their supplies and equipment through the associa-
tion; nor shall exemptions be denied any such association because
there is accumulated and maintained by it a reserve required by
state law or a reasonable reserve for any necessary purpose...
(13) Corporations organized by an association exempt under
the provisions of paragraph (12), or members thereof, for the
purpose of financing the ordinary crop operations of such mem-
bers or other producers, and operated in conjunction with such
association . . .
(14) Corporations organized for the exclusive purpose of
holding title to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning
over the entire amount thereof, less expenses, to an organization
which is exempt . . .
(16) Voluntary employees' beneficiary associations . . if
c . . 85 per centum or more of the income consists of amounts
collected from members...
(17) Teachers' retirement fund associations of a purely local
character . . .
(19) Voluntary employees' beneficiary associations . . . if
. . . admission to membership in such association is limited to
individuals who are officers or employees of the United States
Government . ."
The cold picture presented by this statutory analysis of the exemp-
tions may be given some life by discussing the way in which the provi-
sions have fared in the courts. It would seem most convenient to do
this by treating separately the various types of cooperatives. No one
classification of cooperatives can be made to meet everyone's satisfac-
tion but the ensuing division, heretofore made by the writer,2 4 seems to
be satisfactory for most practical purposes.
Consumers' Cooperatives. There is no general exemption for con-
sumers' cooperatives.2 5 It has been contended unsuccessfully that the
twelfth exemption, to "farmers', fruit growers', or like associations
organized and operated on a cooperative basis . . .", is applicable to
consumers' cooperatives. 26 The courts have held that, because of the
24. PAcKEI, CoopERATivES (1940) 9 et seq.
25. Cooperative Oil Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 115 F. (2d) 666 (C. C. A. 9th,
1940).
26. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 878,
879 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Sunset Scavenger Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 453,
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doctrine of ejusdem generis, the exemption must be confined to agri-
cultural organizations like farmers' or fruit growers' associations.
Certain specific types of consumers' cooperatives, however, are
exempted. Thus in the tenth exemption are included certain ".
mutual ditch or irrigation companies, mutual or cooperative telephone
companies, or like organizations . . .". A court may take the posi-
tion that "like organizations" refers to other utility cooperatives such as
rural electrification cooperatives. The draftsmanship of the provision,
however, is far from satisfactory, because preceding the quoted lan-
guage is the phrase "benevolent life insurance associations of a purely
local character" which manifestly is outside the scope of utility coopera-
tives.
Whether a consumers' cooperative operating as a buying club
comes within the ninth exemption to "clubs organized and operated ex-
clusively for pleasure, recreation and other nonprofitable pur-
poses . . . ," apparently, is undecided by any court. Although the
word "nonprofitable" by itself might be used to describe the operations
of a cooperative, 27 that construction becomes difficult where the word
is used in conjunction with "pleasure" and "recreation".
28
The courts have had the occasion to consider the exemption status
of housing cooperatives, a form of consumers' cooperative. In Gar-
den Homes Company v. Commissioner 2 9 exemption was claimed by
such an organization as a (i) building and loan association, (2) con-
sumers' cooperative, (3) municipal agency or (4) civic organization.
The cooperative was denied the exemption on the first three grounds,
but it was held to be exempt on the fourth ground. It should be noted,
however, that in that case the City of Milwaukee had a real interest in
the enterprise. In the more recent case of Amalgamated Housing Cor-
455 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) ; Garden Homes Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F. (2d) 593, 596
(C. C. A. 7th, 1933). In the first case the court stated that it need not consider
whether the exemption without such a limitation would be discriminatory.
27. See PACKEL, COOPMRATIVES (1940) 21.
28. Cf. Amalgamated Housing Corp., 37 B. T. A. 817 (I938), aff'd, io8 F. (2d)
ioio (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ("nonprofit" used in conjunction with 'promotiofi of social
welfare") ; Stanford University Bookstore v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 71o (App. D.
C. 1936) (bookstore paying patronage refunds claimed to be operated for educational
and non-profitable purposes). In Jockey Club v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 597, 598
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935) a jockey club was held non-exempt since mere proof that gross in-
come other than dues was less than expenses did not show that transactions with non-
members were not a source of income inuring to members.
29. 64 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933). One reason given for the conclusion was
that the corporate entity must be disregarded. In Wood v. Rasquin, 21 F. Supp. 211
(E. D. N. Y. 1937), aff'd, 97 F. (.!d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) the court refused to
disregard the corporate entity so as to permit a member of the housing cooperative to
deduct in his income tax return his portion of the mortgage interest and taxes paid by
the cooperative. In Burr Creamery Corporation v. Commissioner, 62 F. (2d) 407
(C. C. A. 9th, 1932), cert denied, 289 U. S. 730 (1?33) the court took the position that
it should not disregard the separate corporate entity of a wholly owned subsidiary of
an exempt cooperative.
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poration v. Commissioner,0 a limited dividend housing cooperative was
held to be non-exempt and the contintion that it was a civic organiza-
tion was rejected.
Marketing Cooperatives. In view of the tremendous growth of the
marketing cooperative movement throughout the country, it is expect-
able that their tax exemption would present many cases raising ques-
tions of statutory construction. In almost all the cases, the problems
have arisen because of dealings with non-members. The twelfth ex-
emption requires "turning back" to members or other producers "the
proceeds of sales, less the necessary marketing expenses."
Under this language the courts have established very clearly that
there must be equality of treatment for non-members, or the exemption
will be lost. Thus cooperatives are deprived of the exemption if
patronage refunds are payable to members but not to non-members, 81
or if only partial refunds are made to non-members.3 2 The same con-
clusion has been reached where patronage refunds were credited to non-
members but only for accumulation to pay for a share of stock.3 3 In
the latter situation it was held that it is not equality of treatment to
require a non-member to become a member.
Not only must there be equality of treatment as to patronage
refunds but also as to reserves or other accumulations. If the coopera-
tive, instead of making patronage refunds, uses its excess receipts to
increase its plant and equipment which "inure ultimately to the benefit
of members to the exclusion of non-members" the exemption is lost.3 4
This is true even though the cooperative proves that its reserve or sur-
plus was reasonable and necessary.3 5 Where receipts go to reserves or
surplus, the necessary equality of treatment can be had by a protective
recognition of non-members in surplus,3 6 or possibly by an effective
provisio i that no part of the surplus or reserve should inure to the
benefit of any member or individual.3
7
30. 37 B. T. A. 817 (1938), aff'd without opinion, Amalgamated Housing Corp. v.
Commissioner, io8 F. (2d) IOIO. (C. C. A. 2d, i94o).
3. Farmers' Union Co-operative Co. v. Commissioner, go F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A.
8th, 1937); Fruit Growers' Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 56 F. (2d) go (C. C. A. 9th,
1932) ; Farmers' Co-op. Co. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 123 (Ct Cl. 1938) ; Farmers'
Union Co-op. Supply Co. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 128 (Ct. Cl. i938).
32. Riverdale Co-op. Creamery Ass'n v. Commissioner, 48 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931).
33. Farmers' Union Co-op. Supply Co. v. United States,.25 F. Supp. 93 (Ct Cl.
1938).
34. Fertile Coop. Dairy Ass'n v. Huston, 33 F. Supp. 712 (N. D. Iowa, 1940),
aff'd, I19 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 8th, I94i); cf. Burr Creamery Corp. v. Commissioner,
62 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
35. Fertile Coop. Dairy Ass'n v. Huston, ii9 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 8th, i941).
36. Id. at 277; cf. Midland Cooperative Wholesale, 44 B. T. A. 824 (1941).
37. This might be accomplished by a charter provision that reserves and surplus
upon liquidation should go to some charitable or public purpose.
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Business Purchasing Cooperatives. Ordinary business purchasing
cooperatives are not exempt under the statute,38 but this is not true of
farmers' purchasing cooperatives which come within the twelfth exemp-
tion by being organized and operated "for the purpose of purchasing
of supplies and equipment . . . at actual cost, plus necessary ex-
penses." 39 Non-agricultural purchasing cooperatives have sought ex-
emption on different grounds but have not met with success. Thus a
printing cooperative 40 and credit agency cooperatives 41 have, unsuc-
cessfully contended that they were exempt as business leagues under
the seventh exemption.
Workers' Productive Societies. An organization of workers who
pool resources in order to operate their own plant or productive enter-
prise is unusual in this country, and apparently no such organization
has been involved in income tax litigation. It might be contended that
they come within the first exemption to "labor . . . organizations".
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, has stated that: "The fact that
its membership happens to consist mainly of laborers is not determina-
tive." 42 In two cases, one involving advertising agents 43 and the
other garbage collectors, 44 cooperative corporations organized by them
in conjunction with the furnishing of their services were held not to
be within the twelfth exemption to "farmers', fruit growers' or like
associations organized and operated on a cooperative basis . .
Financial Cooperatives. Included in the foregoing list of exemp-
tions are five kinds of financial institutions, mutual savings banks,
building and loan associations,45 cooperative banks, crop financing cor-
porations and teachers' retirement fund associations. In A-C Invest-
ment Ass'n v. Commissioner 4 it was held that an unincorporated
employees' association which received deposits from members and
loaned money on real estate bonds and mortgages was a "mutual say-
38. Bakers' Mutual Coop. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 117 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A. 3d,1
1941).
39. The agricultural purchasing cooperative will of course be denied exemption if
non-members are not given equality of treatment. See cases cited notes 31-35 mrpra.
40. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A.
7th, i92g), cert. denied, 28o U. S. gi (1929).
41. Retailers Credit Ass'n v. Commissioner, go F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937);
Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau v. Commissioner, 37 F. (2d) 88o (C. C. A. 8th,
193o) ; Durham Merchants' Ass'n v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 71 (M. D. N. C. 1940).
But cf. Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 8th, ig29).
42. Workingmen's Cooperative Association, 3 B. T. A. 1352, 1354 (1926). But cf.
Portland Co-operative Labor Temple Ass'n, 39 B. T. A. 450 (1939).
43. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 878
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
44. Sunset Scavenger Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 9th,
1936)
45. Building and loan associations are entitled to the exemption even if some deal-
ings are had with non-members. Cf. United States v. Cambridge Loan & Building
Co., 278 U. S. 55 (1928).
46. 68 F. (2d) 386 (App. D. C. 1933).
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ings bank" within the second exemption. It was clearly a mutual
organization. In this country there are many large savings banks with-
out capital stock which are sometimes referred to as mutual savings
banks, although they are not owned and controlled by the depositors.
The question of whether they are properly entitled to exemption under
the language of the statute apparently has not received judicial scrutiny.
Insurance Cooperatives. The Keystone Automobile Club case,4
7
referred to at the outset of this article, denied exemptions to two insur-
ance companies which lacked mutuality in the sense that the companies
were not democratically owned and controlled. In that case the two
insurance companies were wholly owned subsidiaries of the Keystone
Automobile Club. The directors of the insurance companies were
elected by a proxy vote cast by the directors of the Club. The Club
directors were elected by members of the Club, many of whom were
not policyholders. Policyholders who were not members of the Club
had no right to vote. The court said:
"Counsel for petitioners contend that 'the primary and funda-
mental characteristic of a mutual insurance company is that it be
organized and operated exclusively for the purpose of furnishing
insurance at cost to its policyholders.' This ignores an equally
fundamental characteristic of mutual or cooperative organizations
-democratic ownership and control." 48
Of similar import is the following statement in Ohio Farmers Indem-
nity Co. v. Commissioner:
"A mutual company is one in which the distinguishing feature
is the mutuality of cooperation of the members united for that pur-
pose, each taking a proportionate part in the management of its
affairs and being at once insurer and insured, participating alike
in its profits and losses, all its members being policyholders." 4
The significance of control of such organizations is apparent from the
facts in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brou "o which reveal
that to obtain majority control of an alleged mutual insurance company
there was paid for shares with a par value of $56,2oo, on which
semi-annual dividends could not exceed 3Y2 per cent., the sum of
$2,5o0,ooo. The shares were later sold for $3,00o,000 and still later
for $4,oooooo.51
In Baltimore Equitable Society v. United States 52 the court held
that the doing of io per cent. of its business with non-members, de-
47. 4 C. C. H. 194i Fed. Tax Serv. ff 967i, 41-2 U. S. T. C. 9671 (C. C. A.
49. io8 F. (2d) 665, 667 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).
50. 213 U. S. 25, 31 (1909).
5i. Royal Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 247 Fed. 437, 442 (C. C. A.
2d, 1917).
52. 3 F. Supp. 427 (Ct Cl., 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 66z (I933).
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prived an insurance company of an exemption as a mutual insurance
company.53  In MacLaughlin v. Philadelphia Contributionship54 an
admittedly mutual company was denied exemption because its purpose
was not only insurance but also investment.55
Labor Unions. Labor unions clearly come within the first exemp-
tion to "labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations" which ex-
pression, it has been said, "bespeaks a liberal construction to embrace
the common acceptation of the term, including labor unions and coun-
cils and the groups which are ordinarily organized to protect and pro-
mote the interests of labor." "'
Trade Associations. By definition a trade association does not
engage in the activities normally carried out by its individual members.
Accordingly, a trade association of investment brokers was not held
exempt as a business league where it performed services which the indi-
vidual members performed. 57  Likewise, an association of insurance
companies to improve uniformity and better standards loses its exemp-
tion as a business league when it carries out a program to do printing
for its members.58 Reference has already been made to a similar rule
with regard to an agency of business men which engages in credit or
collection work.59 A true trade association, however, seems to come
within the seventh exemption to "business leagues, chambers of com-
merce, real estate boards or boards of trade."
Self Help Cooperatives. The limitation of self help cooperatives
to use in conjunction with the administration of relief or charitable
activities probably brings them within the eighth exemption to "civic
leagues or organizations not organized for profit."
TAXABILITY OF RECEIPTS DISTRIBUTED AS PATRONAGE REFUNDS
The conclusion that a cooperative is not exempt from income tax
still leaves open the important question of whether its receipts consti-
53. This conclusion was even more obvious in Driscoll v. Washington County
Fire Ins. Co., IIO F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), where a general business was done
with non-members. Cf. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U. S. 578 (1924), where an
exempt religious organization incidentally engaged in transactions in wine and choco-
late with its "own organization and agencies" which the Court said was not trading
in a proper sense because the dealings were not with the public or in competition with
others.
54. 73 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934), cert. denied, 294 U. S. 718 (1935).
55. See Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523, 534 (i92O), where
the footnote comment made is: "The alleged unwisdom and injustice of taxing mutual
life insurance companies while mutual savings banks were exempted had been strongly
pressed upon Congress."
56. Portland Coop. Labor Temple Ass'n, 39 B. T. A. 450, 455 (1939).
57. Northwestern Municipal Ass'n v. United States, 99 F. (2d) 46o (C. C. A. 8th,
1938).
58. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A.
7th, i929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 59I (1929).
59. See note 41 =uPr.
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tute taxable income within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
This is well illustrated by two separate decisions involving a coopera-
tive, organized by 250 insurance companies, which, among other things,
did the printing for the insurance company members. In the earlier
case the claim of the cooperative to an exemption was fought unsuc-
cessfully up to the Supreme Court of the United States.6 0 In the later
case, the cooperative was successful in its contention that excess
receipts amounting to $128,943.46 which were refunded to members
in proportion to patronage did not constitute taxable income.01 The
court did not reach this conclusion upon the ground that the cooperative
was a nonprofit organization. In fact, the court took the position that
the "taxpayer is not a nonprofit corporation in a legal sense. It is sub-
ject to a tax upon the profits by it made. Nevertheless, net profits in
its case must depend upon the facts." 62 The court concluded that the
patronage refund was deductible as if it were a discount or a rebate
made to customers.
The non-taxability of receipts from members of cooperatives
which are distributed as patronage refunds is well settled. 3 In a
recent decision, however, a court went out of its way to state that this
"is a question upon which we express no opinion." 64 The court appar-
ently had in mind that there was no specific statutory provision refer-
ring to such a deduction. It is essential, therefore, to clarify the basis
upon which the income tax is not applicable to such receipts.
A fundamental principle applicable to all cooperatives is the avoid-
ance in the organization of entrepreneur profit. Patronage refunds,
therefore, are not to be considered as a division of the profits. They
are rather a return of the overcharge. Indeed, in France patronage
refunds are called "trop-percu". Thus, the very nature of the enterprise
makes it implicit in all dealings with patrons that the excess of receipts
will be returned in proportion to patronage. Of course, if the enter-
prise is not organized as a cooperative, the return of excess receipts in
the form of patronage refunds is not implicit, and such sums are tax-
able if their payment is directed by way of resolution adopted after
6o. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A.
7th, 1929), cert. denied, 28o U. S. 591 (1929).
61. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A.
7th, 1937), 37 COL. L. Rzv. 872; 5o HAgv. L. REV. 1321.
62. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 75, 76 (C. C. A.
7th, 1937).
63. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A.
7th, 1937) ; State v. Morgan Gin Co., I86 Miss. 66, i89 So. 817 (939) ; cf. Gallatin
Farmers Co. v. Shannon, iog Mont. 155,'93 P. (2d) 953 (1939). Probably the most
thorough discussion of the problem appears in the majority and minority opinions of
the members of the House of Lords in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Styles, 14 App.
Cas. 38r (1889).
64. Cooperative Oil Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 15 F. (2d) 666, 669 (C. C. A.
9th, 1940).
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operations have produced excess receipts. 65 It is important, therefore,
that cooperatives which are incorporated under statutes applicable to
ordinary business corporations should provide in their articles of incor-
poration and by-laws that any distribution of excess receipts will be by
way of patronage refunds.
Patronage refunds could be handled in two ways. In most of the
reported cases it seems that they have been treated as a deduction from
gross income to arrive at net income. Thus in Fruit Growers' Supply
Co. v. Commissioner,6 6 there was deducted from gross income the sum
of $1,312, 114.21 leaving a net income of $421,138.87. The same result
in the case of a consumers' or business purchasing cooperative could be
reached by deducting the patronage refunds from gross receipts or
from the selling price in order to arrive at gross income. This latter
method seems to be more in accord with the facts. Thus, if A sells IO
radios for $ioo subject to a five per cent. discount, his gross income is
$95 o . Likewise, if he charges $ioo per radio and agrees to rebate $5o
on the sale of the tenth radio, his gross income after the sale of the
tenth radio is $95 o . Similarly, if the cooperative collects $iooo for
ten radios and distributes a patronage refund thereon of $5o, its gross
income should be considered to be $950. True, the amount of the
patronage refund was not specifically fixed at the outset, but it was
understood because of the nature of a cooperative organization 67 that
so much of the money as was not needed would be returned.
Patronage refunds are often labelled dividends but that manifestly
does not make them dividends within the meaning of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. 68  The same point has been made recently with regard to
the determination of whether a cooperative could deduct six per cent.
paid on so-called certificates of deposit.69 The court, holding immate-
rial the nomenclature used by the parties, 70 concluded that under the
65. Peoples Gin Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 118 F. C2d) 72 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941);
cf. Fruit Growers' Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 56 F. (2d) go (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
In fact in England it has been held that a non-cooperative corporation is subject to a
tax on its entire income even though it distributes to its patrons a portion of that in-
come pursuant to a prior specific agreement with reference thereto. Last v. London
Assurance Corp., io App. Cas. 438 (1885) ; cf. Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner,
84 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), where the court held that there was no evidence
of an agreement to turn over all the profits. But cf. Central Life Assur. Soc. Mut. v.
Commissioner, 5I F. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 8th, 193).
66. 56 F. (2d) go (C. C. A. 9th, 193z). But cf. State v. Morgan Gin Co., 186
Miss. 66, I89 So. 817 (1939).
67. In Jewelers' Safety Fund Society v. Lowe, 274 Fed. 93 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921),
however, a distinction is made between the payment of a regular premium to a co-
operative and a deposit to cover estimated losses and expenses.
68. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937) ; see Baltimore Equitable Soc. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 427, 431 (Ct. Cl.
1933), cert. denied, 29o U. S. 662 (933).
69. Bakers' Mutual Coop. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 117 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A. 3d,
194I).
70. See New York Life Insurance Co. v. Styles, 14 App. Cas. 381, 409 (1889)
(reference by cooperative to its receipts as profits does not make them profits).
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facts peculiar to that case the six per cent. was not interest on a loan but
rather a dividend on capital investment.
7-
TAXABILITY OF RECEIPTS RETAINED IN RESERVE OR SURPLUS
Several recent decisions seem to cast doubt upon a earlier state-
ment of the writer that: "Even if the cooperative accumulates such
excesses and does not refund them to members, there appears nonethe-
less to be no taxable income, but rather a surplus either contributed by
the members or a surplus in which they retain a specific interest." 72
A significant case supporting this proposition is the decision of the
House of Lords in Jones v. Southwest Lancashire Coal Owners'
Ass'n,'73 where an unsuccessful attempt was made to distir'-ish an
earlier case on the ground that excess receipts were "carried to reserve
and not at once returned to members" in the form of patronage refunds.
It was there said:
"Sooner or later, in meal or in malt, the whole of the company's
receipts must go back to the policyholders as a class, though not
precisely in the proportions in which they have contributed to
them; and the association does not in any true sense make a profit
out of their contributions." 74
An important fact about the recent cases, which on their face ap-
pear to cast doubt upon the correctness of this proposition, is that in
each of them the cooperative dealt with non-members. This is signifi-
cant for two reasons. First, the issue in most of these cases was only
,that of tax exemption which was denied because of inequality in treat-
ment of non-members. 75 Accumulations of surplus were referred to
in those cases to show the lack of equality between members and non-
members, which results in a denial of the exemption, but no disposition
is made of the question as to the extent to which those accumulations
are taxable.
Second, the dealing with non-members is important, because the
accumulations of reserves or a surplus at the expense of non-members
71. Cf. Farmers Union Coop. Co. v. Commissioner, go F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th,
1937); South Carolina Produce Ass'n v. Commissioner, 5o F. (2d) 742 (C. C. A. 4th,
193i); Gallatin Farmers Co. v. Shannon, iog Mont. I55, 93 P. (2d) 953 (i939). But
cf. Garden Homes Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
72. PACKEr, COOPERATnvS (1940) 19r. The possible effect of the recent cases
was pointed out in Hulbert, Book Review (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1116, II7.
73. [1927] A. C. 827.
74. Id. at 832.
75. Fertile Cooperative Daiiy Ass'n v. Huston, iig F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 8th,
i941), aff'g 33 F. Supp. 712 (N. D. Iowa, 1940); Farmers Union Coop. Co. v. Com-
missioner, go F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th, I937) ; Farmers Union Coop. Supply Co. v.
United States, 25 F. Supp. 93 (Ct. Cl. 1938) ; Farmers Coop. Co. v. United States, 23
F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Cl. 1938) ; Farmers Union Coop. Supply Co. v. United States, 23 F.
Supp. 128 (Ct. CL 1938).
154 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
can result in corporate profits; and, therefore, under such circumstances
patronage refunds or capita[ accumulations do not represent mere ex-
cess charges made against members. In one of these cases, however,
the court went very far in its language. 76 It took the viewpoint that a
"Reserve for Working Capital" could not be deducted because the
statute does not authorize such a deduction. The failure to allocate
to non-members an interest in such a reserve appears to justify the
decision.7 7 Yet, the opinion as it stands ignores the fundamental prin-
ciple that payments by members of a cooperative are made to meet the
requirements of the cooperative. If the members choose to raise re-
serves by imposing assessments, by requiring larger payments from
members, or by withholding patronage refunds, the result is the same
as far as the excess is concerned; it is not taxable income.
It has already been indicated that the payments by members are
not intended to produce any entrepreneur profit. It matters not, there-
fore, whether part of those payments are returned as patronage re-
funds or are retained for capital purposes. Thus in Garden Homes
Co. v. Commissioner 78 the court said with regard to excess receipts not
distributed by way of patronage refunds but credited to the capital ac-
count of the members:
"Hence they are to be considered as capital contributions and not
as profit to petitioner within the meaning of the statute. A corpo-
ration cannot receive profits from the sale of its common stock
sold at par, or by reason of the receipt of capital contributions
from its stockholders." 79
A fair deduction from the foregoing authorities, therefore, is that ex-
cess receipts from members -whether used for patronage refunds or for
capital accumulations do not constitute income within the normal
meaning of that word.
CONCLUSION
Cooperatives are neither tax dodgers nor tax evaders. They are
quick, however, to resent discriminatory treatment. They have con-
sidered it part of their liberty and freedom of action to avoid unneces-
sary governmental regulation. They consider it part of that same lib-
erty and freedom to avoid taxation not applicable to them.
194o 6. Cooperative Oil Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner, 115 F. (2d) 666 (C. C. A. 9th,
77. An allocation of interests in such a reserve was the basis for holding the co-
operative free from liability in Midland Coop. Wholesale, 44 B. T. A. 824 (194).
78. 64 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) ; accord: Cambridge Apt. Bldg. Corp.,
44 B. T. A. 617 (1941) ; .874 Park Avenue, 23 B. T. A. 400 (193). Compare the
cases holding that no income is realized from the forfeiture of stock subscriptions.
Commissioner v. Inland Finance Co., 63 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Realty
Bond & Mortgage Co. v. United States, I6 F. Supp. 771 (Ct. Cl. 1936).
79. 64 F. (2d) 593, 598 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
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The time is ripe for Congressional examination of the income
tax status of cooperatives. There should be clarification of the ap-
plicability of the income tax laws to the receipts of cooperatives. There
is no reason why interest, dividends, rents and other income received
by cooperatives should not be subject to the income tax. With refer-
ence to such earnings, there is no distinction between a coopera-
tive enterprise and an ordinary business enterprise.8 0 Of course, if
Congress desires to foster the growth of cooperatives in a particular
field or in all fields, it can grant them exemption from any and all taxes.
That question, however, does not call for legal analysis. It is for the
people to decide through their representatives whether the economic
democracy of cooperatives is so desirable that it should be fostered to
the same extent as other exempt institutions.
In contrast to capital earnings of cooperatives are their receipts
from members. A tax on those receipts or on the unspent portion of
those receipts is no more an income tax than is the tax on club dues.
It might well be that cooperatives may grow to such an extent that the
.limination of ordinary business enterprise will curtail income taxes,
but when that time comes the problem can be met with appropriate legis-
lation. To tax cooperatives on their patronage refunds or on their
reserves or surplus is wholly unsatisfactory, because the tax 'could so
easily be avoided. To take the illustration referred to in the early
part of this article, the cooperative could require additional capital in-
vestment by its members and then could charge five-sixths of the mar-
ket price for gasoline so that at the end of the year it would have no
taxable income. The illustration makes clear that cooperatives do not
make "profits" as a result of dealings with their own members.
The future is vibrant with economic change. Whether or not
cooperatives will play a major role in a new order, time alone will tell.
Yet, the economic democracy of cooperatives and their mode of op-
eration call for the immediate consideration of their income tax prob-
lems on a sound logical basis rather than on the future emotional out-
pourings of their biased protagonists or antagonists. 8 '
8o. "The fact that the investment resulting in accumulation or dividend is made
by a cooperative as distinguished from a capitalistic concern does not prevent the
amount thereof being properly deemed a profit on the investment." Brandeis, J., in
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523, 534 (920).
81. After this article was in galley proof in the hands of the printer, the writer
learned of the article by Joseph O'Meara, Jr., entitled The Federal Income Tax in
Relation to Consuiner Cooperatives (1941) 36 ILL. L. Rv. 6o. That article, inter
alia, stresses the immateriality from the income tax standpoint, of the incorporation
of consumers' cooperatives and concludes: "The taxation of consumer cooperative
associations has. proceeded on an erroneous assumption deriving from Eisner v. Ma-
comber. Contrary to that assumption, so long as these non-profit mutual-benefit
undertakings confine themselves to their proper functions they have no income [i. e.,
from operations] under the Sixteenth Amendment and cannot validly be required to
pay an income tax."
